What cyber risk is being inherited?
Examine the relevance of unsupported systems, vulnerability exposure, endpoint coverage, privileged access and existing security control gaps.
Acquisitions and carve-outs create security questions that cannot be answered by a vulnerability list alone. I help buyers, leadership teams and advisers understand inherited exposure, business dependencies and the practical work needed for separation and post-close stability.
Independent UK-based advisory · Remote and on-site by arrangement
A useful cyber due diligence assessment distinguishes a genuine transaction risk from a routine improvement item. It considers the target's business model, the quality of available evidence and which systems or services are essential to operate safely after completion.
In a carve-out, the work extends beyond assessing the existing estate. Buyers and management need to know which security controls, identities, networks and providers are shared; who will own them on Day 1; and what needs to change as transitional arrangements end.
Examine the relevance of unsupported systems, vulnerability exposure, endpoint coverage, privileged access and existing security control gaps.
Map material service providers, directory and identity dependencies, remote access, managed security services and transitional controls.
Focus on monitoring, incident response, backups, recovery assumptions, supplier hand-offs and critical IT/OT operational continuity.
Separate urgent control decisions from longer-term remediation, with ownership, evidence needs and a practical sequence of work.
Industrial businesses often depend on long-lived platforms, specialist application stacks, connected production systems and third-party access. Standard office-IT assumptions may not reflect operational constraints or the consequences of downtime.
Security decisions therefore need to consider plant operations, unsupported operating systems, endpoint visibility, network boundaries, vendor access and the feasibility of changing controls without disrupting production.
My experience includes cyber security assessment and remediation planning in a European automotive manufacturing business separation, examining legacy technology, endpoint coverage, access controls and operational dependencies across the environment.
I also bring the perspective of having founded and led a specialist security consultancy. The work is framed around the evidence available, material uncertainties and actions that leadership can realistically approve and deliver.
Illustrative experience is deliberately anonymised. Client identities, confidential findings and transaction outcomes are not disclosed.
Read more about my background and approach, or explore Fractional and interim CISO leadership.
The work should produce useful decisions, not just a catalogue of vulnerabilities. Depending on transaction stage, access to evidence and agreed scope, outputs may include:
Evidence-based findings, limitations and recommendations are distinguished clearly. Technical testing or detailed cost estimates are included only where specifically scoped and feasible.
Early enough to influence the risk assessment and transaction planning. Even where the deal timetable is compressed, the review can identify the questions that matter most before completion and the controls that need attention afterwards.
A useful review separates confirmed risks from unresolved uncertainties. It documents what evidence was available, what could not be verified and which assumptions require an owner or a later check.
A separation often depends on systems, service providers and security controls shared with the seller. The priorities include continuity of critical business operations, ownership of those controls on Day 1 and a credible path away from transitional dependencies.
Tell me a little about the organisation, the decision you need to make and the timescale. We can discuss the right scope for independent advisory support.
UK-based · Remote-first and on-site by arrangement